




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Lecture: #05

Operating System Controls for Security



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Secure Operating Systems (CYB610)

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This chapter covers the following topics and concepts

Programs security

Controls for Security

**Developmental Controls
for Security**

**Administrative Controls
for Security**

**Operating System
Controls for Security**




In Previous Lecture you learned:


- Types of Malware
- Relocation Base/Bounds Registers and Tagged Architecture
- The difference between types of Malware
- The Virus Effects
- The Virus Signatures
- Protected Memory and Address
- Buffer Overflows
- Cross Site Scripting (XSS) Attacks
- The memory corruption defenses
- Validating input syntax



When you complete this chapter, you will be able to:

- Know What is “Program security”
- Explain the Basic approaches to having secure programs
- Illustrate how to control security of programs during their development and maintenance







- Program is secure if we trust that it provides/enforces:
 - Confidentiality
 - Integrity
 - Availability



➤ What is “Program security?”

Depends on who you ask

- **user** - fit for his task
- **programmer** - passes all “his” tests
- **manager** - conformance to all specification

➤ Developmental criteria for program security include:

- Correctness of security & other requirements
- Correctness of implementation
- Correctness of testing



❑ Fault tolerance terminology:

Error - may lead to a fault

Fault - cause for deviation from the intended function

Failure - system malfunction caused by fault

❑ Note:

Faults - seen by „insiders” (e.g., programmers)

Failures - seen by „outsiders” (e.g., independent testers, users)

❑ Error/fault/failure example:

Programmer's indexing *error*, leads to buffer overflow *fault*

Buffer overflow *fault* causes system crash (a *failure*)

❑ Two categories of faults :

Permanent faults

Transient faults - can be much more difficult to diagnose



- Basic approaches to having secure programs:

- 1) Judging s/w security **by fixing** program **faults**

- **Red Team / Tiger Team** tries to crack s/w

- If programs withstands the attack => security is good

- 2) Judging s/w security **by testing** program **behavior**

Run tests to **compare behavior vs. requirements** (think testing or Ss/w engg)

Important: If a flaw detected as a *failure* (an effect), look for the underlying *fault* (the cause)

Recall: fault seen by insiders, failure – by outsiders

If possible, detect faults before they become failures



- Any kind of fault/failure can cause a security incident
 - => we must consider security consequences for all kinds of detected faults/failures
- Even inadvertent faults / failures
 - Inadvertent faults are the biggest source of security vulnerabilities exploited by attackers
- Testing only increases probability of eliminating faults



3) Judging s/w security by program security analysis

Best approach to judging s/w security

Analyze what can go wrong

At every stage of program development!

From requirement definition to testing

After deployment

Configurations / policies / practices



- How to control security of programs during their development and maintenance
- **Outline:**
 - a. Introduction
 - b. Developmental controls for security
 - c. Operating system controls for security
 - d. Administrative controls for security
 - e. Conclusions



- “Better to prevent than to cure”
- Preventing security flaws
 - We have seen a lot of possible security flaws
 - How to prevent (some of) them?
 - Software engineering concentrates on developing and maintaining high-quality s/w
 - ✓ We’ll take a look at some techniques useful specifically for developing/maintaining secure s/w



- Three types of controls for security (against program flaws):
 - 1) Developmental controls
 - 2) OS controls
 - 3) Administrative controls



➤ Nature of s/w development

- Collaborative effort
- Team of developers, each involved in ≥ 1 of stages:
 - ❑ Requirement specification
 - Regular req. specs: „do X”
 - Security req. specs: „do X and nothing more”



- Team of developers, each involved in ≥ 1 of stages:
 - Design
 - Implementation
 - Testing
 - Documenting at each stage
 - Reviewing at each stage
 - Managing system development thru all stages
 - Maintaining deployed system (updates, patches, new versions, etc.)
- Both product and process contribute to overall quality
 - incl. security dimension of quality



- Fundamental principles of s/w engineering
 1. Modularity
 2. Encapsulation
 3. Info hiding



1) Modularity

▪ Modules should be:

- Single-purpose - logically/functionally
- Small - for a human to grasp
- Simple - for a human to grasp
- Independent – high cohesion, low coupling
 - High cohesion – highly focused on (single) purpose
 - Low coupling – free from interference from other modules

▪ Modularity should improve correctness

▪ Fewer flaws => better security



2) Encapsulation

- Minimizing info sharing with other modules
 - => Limited interfaces reduce # of covert channels
- Well documented interfaces
- “Hiding what should be hidden and showing what should be visible.”



3) Information hiding

- Module is a black box
 - Well defined function and I/O
- Easy to know *what* module does but not *how* it does it
- Reduces complexity, interactions, covert channels, ...
=> better security



- Many techniques for building solid software
 - 1) Peer reviews
 - 2) Hazard analysis
 - 3) Testing
 - 4) Good design
 - 5) Risk prediction & mangement
 - 6) Static analysis
 - 7) Configuration management
 - 8) Additional developmental controls





1) Peer reviews - three types

■ Reviews

- Informal
- Team of reviewers
- Gain consensus on solutions *before* development

■ Walk-throughs

- Developer walks team through code/document
- Discover flaws in a single design document

■ Inspection

- Formalized and detailed
- Statistical measures used

- Various types of peer reviews can be highly effective






2) Hazard analysis

= systematic techniques to expose
potentially hazardous system states,
incl. security vulnerabilities

- Components of HA
 - Hazard lists
 - What-if scenarios – identifies non-obvious hazards
 - System-wide view (not just code)
 - Begins Day 1
 - Continues throughout SDLC (= s/w dev't life cycle)
- Techniques
 - HAZOP – hazard and operability studies
 - FMEA – failure modes and effects analysis
 - FTA – fault tree analysis





3) Testing – phases:

- Module/component/unit testing of indiv. modules
 - Integration testing of interacting (sub)system modules
 - (System) function testing checking against requirement specs
 - (System) performance testing
 - (System) acceptance testing – with customer against customer's requirements – on seller's or customer's premises
 - (System) installation testing after installation on customer's system
 - Regression testing after updates/changes to s/w
- Types of testing
 - Black Box testing – testers can't examine code
 - White Box / Clear box testing – testers can examine design and code, can see inside modules/system



4) Good design

Good design uses:

- i. Modularity / encapsulation / info hiding
- ii. Fault tolerance
- iii. Consistent failure handling policies
- iv. Design rationale and history
- v. Design patterns

- i. Using **modularity / encapsulation / info hiding**
- as discussed above



4) Good design

ii. Using **fault tolerance** for reliability and security

- System tolerates component failures
- **System more reliable than any of its components**
 - Different than for security, where system is as secure as its weakest component
- **Fault-tolerant approach:**
 - Anticipate faults (car: anticipate having a flat tire)
 - **Active fault detection** rather than **passive fault detection**
(e.g., by use of mutual suspicion: active input data checking)
 - Use redundancy (car: have a spare tire)
 - Isolate damage
 - Minimize disruption (car: replace flat tire, continue your trip)



4) Good design

iii. Using consistent failure handling policies

- Each failure handled by one of 3 ways:
 - **Retrying**
 - Restore previous state, redo service using different „path”
 - E.g., use secondary code instead of primary code
 - **Correcting**
 - Restore previous state, correct sth, run service using the same code as before
 - **Reporting**
 - Restore previous state, report failure to error handler, don't rerun service
- Example – How fault-tolerance enhances security
 - If security fault destroys important data (availability in CIA), use f-t to revert to backup data set



4) Good design

iv. Using design rationale and history

- Knowing it (incl. knowing design rationale and history for security mechanisms) helps developers modifying or maintaining system



4) Good design

v. Using design patterns

- Knowing it enables looking for patterns showing what works best in which situation
 - Value of Good Design
 - Easy maintenance
 - Understandability
 - Reuse
 - Correctness
 - Better testing
- => translates into (saving) BIG bucks !



5) Risk prediction & management

- Predict and manage risks involved in system development and deployment
 - Make plans to handle unwelcome events should they occur
- Risk prediction/mgmt are esp. important for security
 - Bec. unwelcome and rare events can have security consequences
- Risk prediction/mgmt helps to select proper security controls (e.g., proportional to risk)



6) Static analysis

- Before system is up and running, examine its design and code to locate security flaws
 - More than peer review
- Examines
 - Control flow structure (sequence in which instructions are executed, incl. iterations and loops)
 - Data flow structure (trail of data)
 - Data structures
- Automated tools available



7) Configuration management

= process of controlling system modifications during development and maintenance

- Offers security benefits by scrutinizing new/changed code
- Problems with system modifications
 - One change interfering with other change
 - E.g., neutralizing it
 - Proliferation of different versions and releases
 - Older and newer
 - For different platforms
 - For different application environments (and/or customers categories)



7) Configuration management

- **Reasons** for software modification
 - Corrective changes
 - To maintain control of system's day-to-day functions
 - Adaptive changes
 - To maintain control over system's modifications
 - Perfective changes
 - To perfect existing acceptable system functions
 - Preventive changes
 - To prevent system's performance degradation to unacceptable levels



8) Additional developmental controls

8a) Learning from mistakes

Avoiding such mistakes in the future enhances security

8b) Proofs of program correctness

- Formal methods to verify pgm correctness
- Logic analyzer shows that:
 - initial assertions about inputs...
 - ... through implications of pgm statements...
 - ... lead to the terminal condition (desired output)
- Problems with practical use of pgm correctness proofs
 - Esp. for large pgms/systems
- Most successful for specific types of apps
 - E.g. for communication protocols & security policies

Even with all these developmental controls (1-8) –
still no security guarantees!



1) Standards and guidelines for program development

- Capture experience and wisdom from previous projects
- Facilitate building higher-quality s/w (incl. more secure)
- They include:
 - Design S&G – design tools, languages, methodologies
 - S&G for documentation, language, and coding style
 - Programming S&G - incl. reviews, audits
 - Testing S&G
 - Configuration mgmt S&G

2) Security audits

- Check compliance with S&G
- Scare potential dishonest programmer from including illegitimate code
(e.g., a trapdoor)



3) Separation of duties

- Break sensitive tasks into ≥ 2 pieces to be performed by different people
(learned from banks)
- Example 1: modularity
 - Different developers for cooperating modules
- Example 2: independent testers
 - Rather than developer testing her own code



- Developmental controls not always used

OR:

- Even if used, not foolproof
=> Need other, complementary controls, incl. OS controls
- Such OS controls can protect against some program flaws



❖ Trusted software

- code rigorously developed and analyzed so we can trust that it does all and only what specs say
 - Trusted code establishes foundation upon which untrusted code runs
 - Trusted code establishes security baseline for the whole system
 - In particular, OS can be trusted s/w



❖ Key characteristics determining if OS code is trusted

- 1) Functional correctness
 - OS code consistent with specs
- 2) Enforcement of integrity
 - OS keeps integrity of its data and other resources even if presented with flawed or unauthorized commands
- 3) Limited privileges
 - OS minimizes access to secure data/resources
 - Trusted program s must have „need to access” and proper access rights to use resources protected by OS
 - Untrusted program s can't access resources protected by OS
- 4) Appropriate confidence level
 - OS code examined and rated at appropriate trust level



- Similar criteria used to establish if s/w other than OS can be trusted
- Ways of **increasing security** if **untrusted** programs present:
 1. Mutual suspicion
 2. Confinement
 3. Access log

1) **Mutual suspicion** between programs

- Distrust other programs – treat them as if they were incorrect or malicious
 - program protects its interface data
 - With data checks, etc.



2) Confinement

- OS can confine access to resources by suspected program
- **Example 1:** strict compartmentalization
 - program can affect data and other programs *only* within its **compartment**
- **Example 2:** **sandbox** for untrusted programs
- Can limit spread of viruses



3) Audit log / access log

- **Records** who/when/how (e.g., for how long) accessed/used which objects
 - Events logged: logins/logouts, file accesses, program executions, device uses, failures, repeated unsuccessful commands (e.g., many repeated failed login attempts can indicate an attack)
- **Audit** frequently for unusual events, suspicious patterns
- It is a **forensic measure** not protective measure
 - Forensics – investigation to find who broke law, policies, or rules (a posteriori, not a priori)



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Thank You

